5 min

Fourth Circuit Sides With Maryland Over Kalshi, But All Three Judges Differ On Key Questions

Court voted 2-1, with the two concurring opinions based on different reasons

by Daniel O'Boyle

Last updated: November 17, 2026

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit became the third appellate court to side with a state against Kalshi, ruling in Maryland’s favor Tuesday. But with all three judges having different interpretations of the key legal questions, the decision may do more to highlight the need for the Supreme Court to settle the matter.

The court voted 2-1 to affirm the decision from the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. However, the two judges who agreed to affirm — Roger Gregory and Stephanie Thacker — had different reasons why.

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Gregory’s opinion focused on whether the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) preempts state gambling laws, concluding that it does not. Thacker’s opinion focused on whether sports event contracts are swaps and concluded that they are not. Both opinions also differed from past appellate court opinions that also found no preemption or that the contracts are not swaps.

A determination either that the CEA does not preempt state gambling laws or that sports contracts are not swaps is enough for the case to be decided in the state’s favor.

Gregory wrote that he did not decide the swaps question because the case could be decided by preemption alone, while Thacker’s opinion did not use the word “preempt” at all.

Judge DeAndra Gist Benjamin wrote the dissenting opinion, arguing that sports contracts are swaps and the CEA does preempt state law.

Maryland’s district court was the first federal court to side with a state on the question of sports event contracts, back in August 2025.

One judge focuses on preemption

Gregory’s opinion primarily addressed the two different ways in which Kalshi argues that state law is preempted by the CEA.

“First, Kalshi argues that Congress occupied the field by granting the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over the sports event contracts at issue, thereby leaving no room for concurrent state regulation,” he wrote. “Second, Kalshi contends that, even if Maryland retains some regulatory authority, its gaming laws conflict with the CEA because they stand as an obstacle to the federal scheme Congress established. 

“I disagree with both arguments.”

The first argument — commonly called “field preemption” — is supported by a line in the CEA that says the CFTC has “exclusive jurisdiction” over certain “transactions involving swaps.”

“Read in isolation, that language appears to support Kalshi’s position,” Gregory wrote. “But statutes are not read one provision at a time.”

Gregory argued that the “exclusive jurisdiction language must be read in conjunction with the CEA’s “special rule” and the CFTC’s (soon to be replaced) rule 40.11, which is its implementation of the special rule. The special rule says the CFTC has the power to ban contracts involving gaming, while 40.11 says that exchanges “shall not” list gaming contracts. 

Gregory argued that as sports event contracts involve gaming, and have been self-certified by Kalshi rather than explicitly approved, the “exclusive jurisdiction” language does not apply to them.

“Put simply, Kalshi’s gaming contracts remain listed because Kalshi certified that they comply with the CEA and the CFTC [Commodity Futures Trading Commission] has not issued a final determination requiring their removal,” he wrote. “But that explains why the contracts continue to trade. It does not establish that they are traded pursuant to § 7 in the sense required for the CEA’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction.”

Another judge: Sports results aren’t events

Thacker’s opinion focused on the definition of a swap. In the CEA, a swap is defined as “dependent on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence.”

Thacker noted that “event” and “occurrence” were not defined in the CEA. Like the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, she concluded that the two different words cannot mean the same thing, and that the winner of a sporting event cannot be considered the occurrence of an event.

“Rather than conditioning payment on whether or to what extent an event takes place, Appellant’s sporting event based contracts condition payment on the result of an event. In other words, these contracts take for granted that the selected event will occur (and occur to completion, at that),” she wrote. “For Appellant’s contracts, whether a prediction turns out to be right or wrong — and who gets paid — depends solely on the outcome of the completed sporting event.”

Dissenting judge disagrees on swaps, preemption

Benjamin disagreed with both of her colleagues on the bench. 

Addressing Thacker’s swaps argument, she wrote: “I find it hard to agree that the outcome of a sporting event, such as whether a team wins a game, is not the ‘occurrence’ of an event — even if it is also the ‘outcome’ of an event. In my view, these terms are not mutually exclusive.”

She pointed to the “special rule” as an argument in Kalshi’s favor, making the point that the rule addresses swaps that involve gaming, and therefore suggests that involving gaming does not put a contract outside of the definition of a swap.

However, Benjamin went on to state that parlays and prop bets did not meet the definition of a swap because they do not have sufficient economic consequences.

Regarding Gregory’s preemption arguments, Benjamin again argued that the special rule benefited Kalshi.

“The special rule allows the CFTC to prohibit these gaming contracts if it deems them contrary to the public interest. This is an express grant of authority to the CFTC to regulate gaming contracts on DCMs [designated contract markets],” she wrote.

She acknowledged that gaming has traditionally been an area of regulation by the states, but said that as Kalshi was regulated by the CFTC, the CEA gives the CFTC “exclusive jurisdiction” over its contracts.

Kalshi highlights ‘splintered’ decision

Kalshi could ask for an en banc hearing, or appeal to the Supreme Court.

In an emailed response to InGame, a Kalshi spokesperson noted that while many judges have ruled against the business, there was not a unifying argument that those judges could agree on.

“Judges can’t agree with each other on why we’re wrong,” the spokesperson said. “This splintered decision, including three separate contradictory opinions, demonstrates there is no unified coherent legal argument against prediction markets.” 

The Third Circuit found in favor of Kalshi in a 2-1 decision, while the Ninth Circuit found that state gambling laws are preempted for bona fide swaps, but sports contracts are not swaps (not because of the event vs outcome distinction that Benjamin used, but because it found the contracts did not have sufficient financial consequences).

Only the Sixth Circuit found that both state gambling laws are preempted and that sports contracts are not swaps, with the reasoning for its preemption decision not focusing on the special rule or 40.11 like Judge Gregory.

The disagreement may provide more reason for the Supreme Court to take up a prediction markets case this term. In September, New Jersey asked the court to consider its appeal of the Third Circuit case.

Kalshi has asked for more time to file its response, which is now due Dec. 7.  

Maryland had agreed not to enforce its gambling laws against Kalshi until the Fourth Circuit made its decision. With the court having now ruled, Maryland may sue Kalshi in state court and attempt to get its sports contracts banned in the state. Nevada, Michigan, Washington, and most recently Louisiana have all won injunctions that banned sports contracts in their states, forcing prediction markets to geofence.

The CFTC earlier this month told exchanges that geofencing could violate its core principles. It remains to be seen whether it will continue to permit exchanges to geofence if it is in response to state court orders.

Other states in the Fourth Circuit may also have clearer paths now to ban sports contracts. North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia are the other Fourth Circuit states.